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Abstract
The aim of this article is to present a cryptosystem with a new key exchange protocol based on
Diophantine equations of polynomial type. Our protocol is inspired by that of H. Yosh whose
security comes from a translation of Diophantine equations. We suggest here a key exchange
protocol relying on the hardness of solving Diophantine equations in the ring of S-integers.
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1. Introduction
The starting point of public key cryptography is con-
sidered in the article of Die and Hellman [1] where
the authors describe a new kind of cryptography, in-
cluding the need of a key distribution system, known as
the Die-Hellman key exchange protocol. The theory of
public key cryptography has gone through a vast devel-
opment since the introduction of their protocol. Some
protocols turned out to be un-secure, and others were
considered to be safe. However, a breakthrough due to
the continuous eorts may break the security of any pro-
tocol, so creating new key exchange protocols remains
one of the primary tasks in the theory of cryptogra-
phy. Indeed, key exchange protocols are mainly based
on mathematical problems, which are suciently di-
cult.
In 2011, H. Yosh [2] suggested the use of a key ex-
change protocol, the security of which is based on the
hardness of solving Diophantine equations. In [3], N.
Hirata-Kohno and A. Peth}o analyzed the protocol due to
Yosh, revealing several weaknesses of the protocol, and
suggested a modication of it. They removed partially
the weaknesses and suggested a choice of the parameters,
which is secure against ciphertext-only attack.
We give here a new key exchange protocol based on
S-integer solutions to Diophantine equations with an ex-
ample, relying again on the idea by Yosh, but addition-
ally combined with the complexity of S-integers. In our
new protocol, the public key size is much less than in the
previous versions, but provides at least the same level of
security.
2. The key exchange protocol of H. Yosh
Let R be a ring. The protocol of Yosh is dened in
the case R = Z, but the idea works in the same way for
dierent rings, therefore we shall present the protocol in
a general case. In [3] Hirata-Kohno and Peth}o simplied
the protocol of Yosh, according to their needs, however
that is essentially the protocol of Yosh. We shall describe
it now in details.
Alice and Bob are willing to agree in a secret key using
only unsecured channels for their communications. In
order to do this they perform the following steps:
(i) Alice chooses elements r1; : : : ; rm 2 R and con-
structs a polynomial Diophantine equation with co-
ecients in R:
f(X1; : : : ; Xm) = 0; in X1; : : : ; Xm 2 R (1)
such that the tuple (r1; : : : ; rm) 2 Rm is a solution
to the equation (1).
(ii) Alice keeps the tuple (r1; : : : ; rm) 2 Rm secret, and
sends the polynomial f(X1; : : : ; Xm) to Bob via the
unsecured channel. Consequently, the polynomial
f(X1; : : : ; Xm) has to be considered public.
(iii) Bob chooses randomly a polynomial g(X1; : : : ; Xm)
2 R[X1; : : : ; Xm] and chooses random elements
ai 2 R and 0  bi 2 Z (1  i  n) with b1; : : : ; bn
odd, and denes the function
Tai;bi(X) := (X + ai)
bi (1  i  n)
so as to be invertible. Then Bob computes the poly-
nomial
H(X1; : : : ; Xm) := Tan;bn (: : : Ta1;b1 (g(X1; : : : ; Xm)) : : : )
and takes a random element
h(X1; : : : ; Xm) 2 H(X1; : : : ; Xm)+
f(X1; : : : ; Xm) R[X1; : : : ; Xm]:
(iv) Bob then sends g and h to Alice through the un-
secured channel, but he keeps the elements ai 2 R
and bi 2 Z0 (1  i  n) secret.
(v) Alice, in the possession of g and h, computes the
values s = g(r1; : : : ; rm) and u = h(r1; : : : ; rm), and
sends the element u to Bob through the unsecured
channel.
{ 1 {
JSIAM Letters Vol. ** (****) pp.1{ Attila Berczes et al.
(vi) For 1  i  n, Bob computes the inverse functions
T 1ai;bi to the bijective polynomial functions Tai;bi ,
and obtains the value
s = T 1a1;b1

: : : T 1an;bn (u) : : :

;
which should be the shared secret of Alice and Bob.
3. Previous results concerning the secu-
rity of the protocol of Yosh
In [3] the authors proved the correctness of the proto-
col of Yosh, simplied it and gave a careful analysis of
the security of the simplied protocol.
They also suggested a nite eld version. For the
choice of the polynomial f the most important require-
ment is that it has to be extremely hard to solve the
equation f(X1; : : : ; Xm) = 0 in Rm. More precisely they
proved:
Proposition A (Proposition 3 of [3])
If the adversary can compute many solutions to (1), not
necessarily (r1; : : : ; rm), then he/she can compute the
element s and breaks the protocol.
The authors in the proof also pointed out that 2m
solutions to (1) may be enough to break the protocol.
Compared to Proposition A, there is an important
drawback to the nite eld version of the protocol. In-
deed, if we choose random values r2; : : : ; rm from the
nite eld for X2; : : : ; Xm then a question to decide
whether the equation
f(X1; r2; : : : ; rm) = 0
has a solution in X1 from the nite eld or not, can be
answered in probabilistic polynomial time [4], and in the
case, a solution also can be found in probabilistic polyno-
mial time. This might enable the attacker to nd many
solutions to the equation (1), which in view of Propo-
sition A undermines the security of the protocol. So we
cannot consider the nite eld version of the protocol
safe.
Thus in the present paper we suggest a variant of the
protocol of Yosh, which works over the rational integers
and the ring of S-integers, in the case when considerably
more solutions to (1) are needed to break the protocol.
4. Our new key exchange protocol on the
ring of S-integers
In many cases, even if it is not possible to completely
solve a Diophantine equation, it may be feasible to nd
several \small" solutions by chance. This makes the pro-
tocol of Yosh un-secure, both in its original form and in
the modied form analyzed in [3]. This weakness might
be compensated by choosing the parameter n large, but
as pointed out in [3], this becomes impossible by practi-
cal considerations. Further, by the same reason the pos-
itive integers bi (1  i  n) must be also very small.
Thus the number of the free parameters ai 2 R and
bi 2 Z0 (1  i  n) cannot be suciently increased in
the protocol of Yosh.
We mention that the polynomial functions Tai;bi in
the protocol of Yosh are of a special form only be-
cause this form may guarantee that their composite
function is invertible. So, in our new key exchange pro-
tocol, rst we suggest to choose a general polynomial
function T which is invertible, instead of the function
Tan;bn (: : : Ta1;b1 (X) : : : ).
Second, let S = fp1; : : : ; pkg be a nite set of dis-
tinct rational primes with a suitable k. Consider a ra-
tional number a=b with a; b 2 Z and gcd (a; b) = 1, such
that the (possibly empty) set of prime divisors of b is
contained in S. This rational number is a so-called S-
integer (corresponding to the specic set S). Denote by
ZS the set of S-integers. Clearly, this set ZS is a subring
of Q  R and ZS contains Z. The elements of ZS have
the property that in their denominators, the exponents
of the primes lying in S can be arbitrarily large.
In this article we choose R = ZS and we present the
following modication of the protocol of Yosh. The main
idea is that Alice considers r1; : : : ; rm 2 ZS and Bob
chooses T 2 ZS [X] in the step of the construction of
the polynomial T , that makes the key exchange protocol
possibly more secure, relying on the diculty of nding
solutions in ZS by random search.
Choosing a solution in ZS , we note that it is an easy
task to nd a Diophantine equation which vanishes at
this selected solution, but it is not at all easy to nd a
solution to a given Diophantine equation in S-integers.
This is a typical one-way function to make a key ex-
change protocol.
Our new key exchange protocol is as follows. Alice
and Bob choose a nite set of distinct rational primes
S = fp1; : : : ; pkg with a suitable large k. They keep this
set S and proceed as follows.
(i) Alice chooses elements r1; : : : ; rm 2 ZS and con-
structs a polynomial Diophantine equation inm un-
knowns with coecients in Z:
f(X1; : : : ; Xm) = 0; in X1; : : : ; Xm 2 ZS (2)
such that the tuple (r1; : : : ; rm) 2 ZmS is a solution
to the equation (2) (note that the coecients of
f(X1; : : : ; Xm) are in Z).
(ii) Alice keeps the tuple (r1; : : : ; rm) 2 ZmS secret, and
sends the polynomial f(X1; : : : ; Xm) to Bob via the
unsecured channel. Consequently, the polynomial
f(X1; : : : ; Xm) has to be considered public knowl-
edge.
(iii) Bob chooses randomly a polynomial in m variables
g(X1; : : : ; Xm) 2 Z[X1; : : : ; Xm] and chooses an-
other random polynomial function T (X) 2 ZS [X]
such that T : R 7! R is strictly monotonically in-
creasing, namely invertible. Bob then computes the
polynomial
H(X1; : : : ; Xm) = T (g(X1; : : : ; Xm)) ;
and takes a random element h(X1; : : : ; Xm)
2 H(X1; : : : ; Xm)+f(X1; : : : ; Xm)ZS [X1; : : : ; Xm]:
(iv) Bob sends g and h to Alice through the unsecured
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channel, but he keeps the polynomials T (X) and
H(X1; : : : ; Xm) secret.
(v) Alice, in the possession of g and h, computes the
values s = g(r1; : : : ; rm) and u = h(r1; : : : ; rm), and
sends the element u to Bob through the unsecured
channel, while she keeps the value s secret.
(vi) Knowing that the polynomial function T : R ! R
is strictly monotonically increasing continuous func-
tion, indeed bijective, Bob computes the value
s = T 1 (u) ;
which should be the shared secret of Alice and Bob.
To ensure that T : R 7! R is strictly increasing we
need that dT=dX is positive on R. This is fullled if the
degree of T is odd and the coecients are well chosen.
Here we have to mention that in the last step of the
protocol, to compute s one can use the secant method
for the polynomial T (X)   u, since we know that s is
the only real root of T (X)  u = 0.
Proposition 1
The protocol described in Section 4 is correct.
Proof.
Alice can compute s because she knows g and r1; : : : ; rm.
As f(r1; : : : ; rm) = 0, we have
u = h(r1; : : : ; rm) = H(r1; : : : ; rm):
Since H(r1; : : : ; rm) = T (g(r1; : : : ; rm)) = T (s) and
T (X) is invertible, we have
s = T 1(u):
Bob can compute s using the secant method (This proof
is essentially same as that of Proposition 1 of [3]).

5. Security aspects
We analyze our protocol from mathematical and cryp-
tographical point of view. It was proved in 1971 by Y.
Matijasevic (see [5]) that the solvability of polynomial
Diophantine equations in integers, thus in S-integers too,
is algorithmically not decidable. Nevertheless, there are
also large classes of Diophantine equations which can be
solved by algorithms (see e.g. [6] and [7]). However, as
in our protocol, if a polynomial is constructed with a
prescribed solution, then this solution can be computed
in at most exponential time in the size of the solution.
In order to have our protocol ecient enough, we have
to choose the form of f such that its parameters are
easy to compute, when a solution vector is given. On
the other hand, by Proposition A, we have to choose f
such that it is hard to nd solutions (r1; : : : ; rm) 2 ZmS
to the equation
f(X1; : : : ; Xm) = 0:
These requirements are obviously contradictory. We ar-
gued in [3] that diagonal polynomials may satisfy both
requirements.
The parameters g; T and r can be chosen randomly,
thus h is a random element of the T (g) + fZS . Besides
f also g; h and u are public objects, and the relation
h(r1; : : : ; rm) = u is public as well. Thus already a pas-
sive adversary knows that (r1; : : : ; rm) satises the \sys-
tem" of equations
f(r1; : : : ; rm) = 0; h(r1; : : : ; rm) = u: (3)
When m > 4, if h is chosen as a random polynomial
and f as a diagonal one such that this system denes a
non-singular algebraic variety in Rm of codimension 2,
we may expect that it is at least similarly hard to nd
an S-integer solution to (3) as to (1).
We have to mention a weak point of our protocol.
The key pairs of public key cryptosystems are stable
objects, they can be used several times. This property
is used in multiple-user setting such as a client server
model. However, the public keys in the protocol of Yosh
do not have this property and the polynomial f and its
roots are only for a single action. If Alice would cre-
ate with k partners common keys using always the same
f and r1; : : : ; rm then denoting by h1; : : : ; hk the corre-
sponding polynomials computed in Step (iii) and setting
ui = hi(r1; : : : ; rm); i = 1; : : : ; k the passive adversary
would get k + 1 independent equations
f(r1; : : : ; rm) = 0; hi(r1; : : : ; rm) = ui; i = 1; : : : ; k
for r1; : : : ; rm. If k + 1  m then these determine
uniquely r1; : : : ; rm. With this respect the protocol of
Yosh behaves as a one time pad, consequently, in the
present form, it cannot be applied in multiple-user set-
ting. We should concentrate us on this problem against
multiple-user setting in our future work.
We also point out that there might exist a way to ob-
tain the value g(r1; : : : ; rm) = s without precisely know-
ing r1; : : : ; rm, but only f; h; g and u being given. An
investigation about such a possibility is an important
and essential problem, which is to be considered in our
situation.
6. Example
Finally we present an example as follows. Let S :=
f167; 359; 379g. We perform the following steps.
(i) Alice chooses the polynomial f with the following
coecients.
f = c1X21 + c2X
5
2 + c3X
3
3 + c4X
7
4 + c5X
4
5 + c6;
c1 = 4806529705;
c2 =  6205175372;
c3 = 925478963;
c4 =  768530557342240919;
c5 = 1746745227;
c6 = 4946407506070084575251776766468057476
355317931641:
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Alice keeps an S-integer solution (r1; r2; r3; r4; r5)
to f = 0 secret which is
r1 =
4747053250
167
;
r2 = 17914675;
r3 =
1640439652
379
;
r4 =
9078809
359
;
r5 = 3039073006:
Note that for (r1; r2; r3; r4; r5) we have at least one
index i such that ri 2 ZSnZ.
Actually, Alice rst generates randomly the so-
lution (r1; : : : ; r5) then computes the coecients
c1; : : : ; c6, which ensure f = 0. The second step
means solving a linear Diophantine equation.
(ii) Bob sets
g = 234578  29879731X2 + 26864732X5
 48958473X1X2 + 7145266643X23
+5537433896X2X4
T = 476538X5 + 703764X4 + 893596X2
+31980091X + 43626626;
h  T (g) mod f:
(iii) Alice computes s, u and gets the following result.
s =
959693338498943929735558007182951
8611708873
;
u = 387935870986922673356671859528440825
048718428727629837317519014456871355
554563200995045873743343613861794426
388290216600683762310234492035907605
5037950450389851860575611414736381
742001944320338406709171444096761973
8975593:
(iv) Using the secant method, Bob computes
T 1(u) = s:
The example shows clearly that the new protocol is
superior to the protocol of [3]. In the present example
f has one more variable than in [3]. In both examples
T has ve parameters, but in [3] only three parameters
were free, because the other two parameters could as-
sume only very small values, while in the present case
all the ve parameters are essentially free. They can be
arbitrary large satisfying the mild assumption dT=dX is
positive on R. Thus by Section 5, the present example
is at least as secure as the example in [3].
On the other hand the size of the public key of
this example is much smaller than of it of [3]. Indeed,
we presented in both cases explicitly the secret keys:
r1; : : : ; rm; T (H); s, and the public keys: f; g; u. The
only missing data is h because this polynomial has a long
form and we supposed that it might be waste of paper to
give all of the form here explicitly, thus we try to explain
it as follows. We computed both examples with MAPLE
13, which gave us the size of the internal representation
of h, which is a multivariate polynomial. As such ob-
jects do not have a canonical representation, the most
honest way to compare the size of two such polynomi-
als is to give the size of their internal representation in
the same computer algebra system. The polynomial h of
[3] has 2107 terms of form aXn11 X
n2
2 X
n3
3 X
n4
4 , where a
denotes an integer and n1; : : : ; n4 non-negative integers.
Moreover the internal representation in MAPLE 13 has
length 800327. In contrast, the same parameter in the
present example has only 269 terms and its internal rep-
resentation in MAPLE 13 has length 18240.
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